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PEA CETIME ESPIONAGE
INTRODUCION
Robert Hanssen, a father of six children, was a twenty-five-year
veteran of the FBI's counterintelligence division and a churchgoing
Catholic.' According to his own admission, which accompanied a ne-
gotiated guilty plea made on July 6, 2001, Hanssen was also a spy who
had operated for the Russian government since 1985.2 Under the
terms of the plea bargain, Hanssen pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of
espionage, and will serve the remainder of his life in federal prison,
submitting to extensive debriefings regarding the scope of his activi-
ties.3 If Hanssen had not taken this plea and gone to trial, the govern-
ment would have sought an even greater punishment: the death
penalty.4
The Hanssen case is not the only example of the government's
invocation of capital punishment for an espionage offense. Less than
two years earlier, the following exchange occurred between an FBI
interrogator and Wen Ho Lee, a suspected spy:
FBI: Do you know who the Rosenbergs are?
Wen Ho Lee: I heard them, yeah, I heard them mention.
FBI: The Rosenbergs are the only people that never cooperated
with the [f]ederal [g]overnment in an espionage case. You know
what happened to them? They electrocuted them, Wen Ho.
FBI: .... Do you want to go down in history? Whether you're pro-
fessing your innocence like the Rosenbergs to the day that they take
you to the electric chair?5
Wen Ho Lee worked as a nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory when he came under suspicion of espionage. 6 Spe-
cifically, the FBI suspected that Lee gave privileged information to
1 Brooke A. Masters & Dan Eggen, Plea Bargain Is Planned in FBI Spying Case, WASH.
Posr, July 4, 2001, at Al; Richard Sisk, Nab FBI Agent as Spy, Secrets Fed to Moscow for $1.4M,
N.Y. DAiLY Navs, Feb. 21, 2001, at 3.
2 Brooke A. Masters, Hanssen Admits Spying Avoids Death Penalty, WAsH. PosT, July 7,
2001, Al.
3 See Press Release, Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ, Thompson
Statement Regarding Hanssen Guilty Plea (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Thompson State-
ment], available at http://vvv.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/July/308ag.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2001).
4 See Brooke A. Masters & Walter Pincus, Sp)-Case Indictment Postponed, WAsH. POsr,
Mar. 2, 2001, at A8 (reporting that federal prosecutors had seriously considered pursuing
the death penalty against Hanssen since the time of his arrest); Thompson Statement,
supra note 3.
5 Interview by Carol Covert and John Hudenko, Special Agents, FBI, with Wen Ho
Lee (Mar. 7, 1999), at http://ivv.wenholee.org/transcript4868.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2001). For a discussion of the Rosenberg espionage case, see infra note 29.
6 Vernon Loeb & Walter Pincus, FBI Misled Wen Ho Lee into Believing He Failed Poly-
graph, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2000, at A2.
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China concerning the sophisticated W-88 nuclear warhead. 7 In the
interview, FBI agents tried to elicit a confession from Lee, despite his
continual protestations of innocence.8
In spite of the hysteria that erupted after Lee's arrest, the FBI had
no evidence for an espionage prosecution against Lee.9 After holding
Lee in solitary confinement for nine months, the government was
forced to release him, dropping fifty-eight of its fifty-nine charges for
lack of evidence. 10
The cases of Robert Hanssen and Wen Ho Lee demonstrate that
a capital espionage prosecution remains a very real possibility in the
United States of America. This legal recourse has been available since
1994, when Congress resurrected the long-moribund federal death
penalty and created two categories of capital peacetime espionage in
the Federal Death Penalty Act."1 The government may now seek the
death penalty against a convicted spy when the offense leads to the
death of an American agent in another country, or when the offense
compromises some element of national security.12
As of the year 2001, no defendant has received a death penalty
sentence under either of these capital espionage provisions. Yet espio-
nage prosecutions are rare in relation to other capital crimes-less
than twenty cases have arisen between the passage of the Federal
Death Penalty Act and the year 2000.13 Moreover, in the eligible espi-
7 Id.
8 Id. Lee was never actually charged with espionage; instead, the government in-
dicted him on fifty-nine charges relating to the mishandling of federal documents. Id.
9 See, e.g., Robert Scheer, No Defense: How the New York Times Convicted Wen Ho Lee;
NATION, Oct. 23, 2000, at 11-12 (arguing that numerous and prominent reports on the
Lee affair by "respected media outlet[s]" such as The New York Times and CBS News
amounted to "spy hysteria").
10 Id. Lee pled guilty to one count of mishandling classified data. Id.
11 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 (a) (1), 794(a) (1994).
12 See id. § 794(a).
13 The Department of Defense's Security Research Center has identified fifteen fed-
eral espionage cases between 1995 and 1998 involving defendants "implicated in an effort
to illegally provide U.S. classified or other sensitive national defense information to a for-
eign interest." See SEC. RESEARCH CTR., DEF. SEC. SERV., RECENT ESPIONAGE CASEs
1975-1999 [hereinafter RECENT ESPIONAGE CASES], at http://www.dss.mil/search-dir/train-
ing/espionage/rec.pdf. At least three other cases arose in 1999-2000, amounting to a
total of nineteen potential espionage prosecutions since the passage of the Federal Death
Penalty Act. See Christopher Marquis, Onetime Army Employee Is Charged with Spyingfor Soviets
for at Least 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at A16 (reporting indictment of George
Trofimoff); Roberto Suro, Australian Arrested on Spy Charge, WASH. PosT, May 18, 1999, at
A5 (reporting arrest of Australian military intelligence analyst Jean-Phillipe Wispelaere);
David A. Vise, INS Officer Charged with Spying for Cuba, WASH. Posr, Feb. 18, 2000, at A8
(reporting arrest of Mariano Faget).
Of these eighteen cases, two resulted in convictions for non-capital espionage of-
fenses, two involved current military officers (and thus fell outside of the jurisdiction of
§ 794(a)), and two others have yet to go to trial. See RECENT ESPIONAGE CASES, supra. The
remaining twelve cases have all ended in plea bargains, either to charges of espionage,
conspiracy to commit espionage, or lesser charges. Id.
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onage cases to date, national security' 4 and ex post facto15 concerns
seem to have deterred prosecutors from aggressively seeking capital
punishment. Despite these factors, political determination to execute
spies remains strong. The Department ofJustice has indicated that it
would pursue the death penalty in an appropriate espionage case.' 6
Before Hanssen's guilty plea, executive branch officials such as Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft and Acting Deputy Attorney General (and
later, FBI director) William S. Mueller argued that the former FBI
agent's crimes merited the death penalty. 17 Following Hanssen's
guilty plea, the Justice Department emphasized that "the decision to
forego the death penalty in this case was a difficult one."18 Notably,
public opinion polls have demonstrated that many Americans would
14 See Thompson Statement, supra note 3 ("[W]e determined that the interests of the
United States would be best served by pursuing a course that would enable our govern-
ment to fully assess the magnitude and scope of Hanssen's espionage activities-an objec-
tive we could not achieve if we sought and obtained the death penalty against him."); see
also RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE 415-18 (2d ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1997) (1983) (noting that the government would have commuted the Rosenbergs'
execution in exchange for testimony against other members of their alleged spy ring);
Brooke A. Masters, Convicted Spy Says He Did It for His Family, WAsH. POST, June 6, 1997, at
Al (reporting that Harold Nicholson avoided the maximum sentence for espionage be-
cause "prosecutors gave him credit for extensive cooperation with FBI and CIA intelligence
officials during thrice-weekly debriefing sessions"); Bill Miller & Walter Pincus, Ex-CA
Agent Given 5 Years in Extortion Case, WASH. Posr, Sept. 26, 1998, at A2 ("By reaching a plea
agreement [with Douglas F. Groat], the government avoided a trial that could have re-
quired disclosing embarrassing CIA operations against foreign embassies.").
15 All of the post-Federal Death Penalty Act espionage violations discovered to date
began prior to the enactment of the law, when the death penalty for peacetime espionage,
although permitted by statute, was unconstitutional due to procedural defects. See sources
cited supra note 13. If one of these defendants had faced the death penalty under the new
statute:
[I] t might be contended that the defendant acted in reliance upon the fact
that the death penalty could not be constitutionally imposed under that
statute. Therefore, the imposition of the death penalty under new procedu-
ral provisions which rendered the previously unconstitutional statute sound
would in essence increase the punishment after the crime was committed,
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Fur-
ther, it would deprive the defendant of a defense to the penalty available at
the time the crime was committed, which is also prohibited by the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
Elizabeth B. Bazan, Espionage and the Death Penalty, 41 FED. B. Nsws &J. 615, 618 (1994).
16 SeeVernon Loeb, Questions About Another Chinese Spy Case, WASH. Posr, Apr. 4, 2000,
at A27 (reporting Senator Arlen Specter's criticism of the Justice Department's failure to
pursue the death penalty in the case of Peter H. Lee, who had confessed to passing nuclear
secrets to China); Sylvia Moreno & Vernon Loeb, Ex-Army Cryptologist Accused of Spying,
WASH. PoST, Oct. 14, 1998, at BI (reporting that U.S. attorneys were "evaluating" the possi-
bility of capital prosecution in the case of David Sheldon Boone); see also supra notes 1-5
and accompanying text (discussing various espionage cases).
17 See Masters, supra note 2; Masters & Eggen, supra note 1.
18 Thompson Statement, supra note 3.
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support a decision to seek the death penalty against an accused spy or
traitor.19
The "appropriate" espionage case may not be far off on the hori-
zon. The Lee affair reveals the U.S. government's conviction that
China is conducting an extensive espionage campaign to steal military
secrets as part of an effort to challenge the United States' global
supremacy. 20 The aftermath of the Hanssen arrest, moreover, has af-
firmed that the era of "open confrontation" between the United States
and Russia is not yet over.2 1 U.S. nuclear technology remains in de-
mand in countries seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons pro-
grams; the advent of the twenty-first century has not decelerated the
threat of political espionage. 22
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the capital espionage
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) with respect to the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."2 3 The
analysis focuses on the 1977 Supreme Court case Coker v. Georgia2 4 and
on subsequent decisions that have established a proportionality stan-
dard of review for determining the suitability of capital punishment
for particular crimes.25 This Note does not discuss the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment for crimes involving a breach of loyalty to
one's country, such as treason or wartime espionage, or for espionage
crimes that fall under military jurisdiction.26
19 See GEORGE GALLUPJR., THE GAL.UP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1988, at 256, 258 (1989)
(noting that 42% of those surveyed in 1988 favored "the death penalty for persons con-
victed of spying for a foreign nation during peacetime," up from a figure of 36% favoring
death for "persons convicted of treason" in 1978); see alsoJames G. Wilson, Chaining the
Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. PITT. L. REv.
99, 158 (1983) (arguing that public support for treason and other political crimes would
rise during a period of national emergency).
20 See, e.g., James Risen &Jeff Gerth, China Stole Nuclear Secrets for Bombs, US Aides Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at Al. Months later, arguing for Lee's detention, the government
claimed that his alleged espionage activities had risked "hundreds of millions of lives." See
Scheer, supra note 9, at 12.
21 Fred Weir, Russia, US Revive Old Rhetori4 CHvisTiAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2001, at
1 (reporting that the Hanssen arrest was the "trigger" for a series of diplomatic expulsions
by the United States and Russia).
22 See RECENT ESPIONAGE CASES, supra note 13 (chronicling numerous espionage cases
involving developing countries since the end of the Cold War).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
24 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
25 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (using proportionality review); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783-785 (1982) (same).
26 Politicians and even jurists have been known to confuse "treason" with other
'crimes against the state" such as espionage. See, e.g., H.R. 4060, 103d Cong. (1994); 140
CONG. REC. H2225 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Stearns) (labeling espio-
nage committed by Aldrich Ames as "treason"); RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 284
(noting thatJudge Irving Kaufman, while sentencing Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for war-
time espionage, addressed the defendants' betrayal as "treason").
PEACETIME ESPIONAGE
Part I of this Note traces the history of the death penalty for
peacetime espionage from its origin in the Espionage and Sabotage
Act of 1954 to its resurrection in the Federal Death Penalty Act of
1994. Part II analyzes the framework of proportionality review, which
involves an objective and a subjective comparative inquiry into the
death penalty's reasonableness.2 7 Parts III and IV, respectively, apply
the objective and subjective analyses to the capital espionage crimes
delineated in § 794(a), comparing those crimes with both murder and
treason under the subjective analysis. This Note concludes that the
death penalty for espionage fails both the objective and subjective pro-
portionality tests under Coker, and is thus unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment.
I
Ti-E HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
PEAcETnw ESPIONAGE
A. The 1954 Espionage Act and Furman v. Georgia
The institution of the death penalty for espionage is a relatively
recent development in this country. The Espionage and Sabotage Act
of 1954 stands as the first congressional legislation authorizing capital
punishment for civilian peacetime espionage.28 Congress intended
In fact, the two crimes have distinct legal definitions. Treason is the only crime de-
fined or even considered in the United States Constitution. According to Article III, Sec-
tion 3, "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
American courts have consistently favored a narrow interpretation of this definition. See,
e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945) (explaining that "the treason rule... is
severely restrictive"); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 110-12 (1807) (rejecting the
English notion of "constructive treason"). See generally JAMEs WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF
TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES 186-235 (Contributions in American History, No. 12, Stan-
ley I. Kutler ed., 1945) (surveying treason under the Constitution).
Espionage under § 794, on the other hand, occurs when a person "with intent or
reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation, communicates... to any foreign goverment... any document...
relating to the national defense." 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Although it is possible for
the same act to constitute both treason and espionage, the latter is a distinct crime that
encompasses activity outside the scope of treason. See United States v. Drummond, 354
F.2d 132, 152 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that the Treason Clause does not bar the creation of
peacetime espionage offenses because the crimes require different specific intents);
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 609-11 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that the Treason
Clause does not bar wartime espionage offenses because the "essential element" of giving
aid to an enemy in a treason prosecution is "irrelevant" to wartime espionage).
27 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
28 Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954, ch. 1261, § 201, 68 Stat. 1216, 1219 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). The current version of the law reads in relevant part:
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury
of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,
delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to
any foreign government ... or to any representative, officer, agent, em-
2002]
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the Act to permit the execution of spies without resort to the legal
technicalities used in the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who
were executed in 1954 for providing the Russians with information
regarding the atomic bomb.29 In that case, the government sought
the death penalty under the 1917 Espionage Act, which permitted
capital punishment for espionage committed during times of war.30
Despite the Second Circuit's affirmation of the constitutionality of the
death penalty for the crime of wartime espionage,31 no court has ever
sentenced anyone to death for peacetime espionage under the Espio-
nage and Sabotage Act of 1954-also known as the "Rosenberg law."
5 2
Certainly one reason for this unwillingness to implement the cap-
ital provision in the Espionage Act was the constitutional uncertainty
that hung over the death penalty during the later part of the provi-
sion's history. In 1972, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Furman v. Georgia,33 which invalidated the death penalty in forty-six
states.34 Five members of the Court agreed that the state capital mur-
der statutes violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
ployee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any docu-
ment.., or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished
by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life ....
18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
29 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 448-49. The Rosenbergs were tried and
executed under the wartime espionage provision of the 1917 Espionage Act. The govern-
ment alleged that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg participated in a conspiracy, beginning in
1944 and lasting until 1950, to provide the Soviet Union with information regarding the
hydrogen bomb. The prosecution successfully argued that the "in times of war" provision
of the 1917 Espionage Act could apply to the conspiracy, because the conspiracy allegedly
began in 1944 while the United States was still fighting Germany andJapan in the Second
World War, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was allied with the United States during
this conflict, and that most of the conspiracy took place after the war was over. See United
States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 111-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("Congress wisely did not
distinguish between a friendly or an enemy country in prescribing punishments for acts of
espionage. The law was intended to protect and to keep inviolate our military secrets from
all foreign powers."). See generally RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 170-274 (describing
in detail the prosecution of the Rosenbergs under the 1917 Espionage Act).
Under the facts in the government's indictment, the Rosenbergs did not and could
not have faced treason charges under the Constitution. See Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 609-11
(explaining that the Rosenbergs were not entitled to the procedural safeguards of a trea-
son trial because their offense was "distinct from the crime of treason defined in ... the
Constitution").
30 Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 2, 40 Stat. 217, 218 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1994)). The 1917 Espionage Act, from which the 1954 Act derives much of its
wording, authorized the death penalty for espionage "in time of war" but limited peace-
time infractions to a sentence of twenty years in prison. Id. § 2, 40 Stat. at 218-19.
31 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1952) (rejecting the petitioners'
claim that the death penalty for an offense against the state "similar but less grave" than
treason violates the Eighth Amendment, but adding that the Supreme Court "may well
think it desirable to review that aspect of our decision in this case").
32 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 448-49.
33 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
34 See id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
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cruel and unusual punishment.8 5 In response, many of these states
developed new statutory schemes providing the sentencing court with
guidelines for imposing the death penalty, including a requirement
that the sentencing court weigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.8 6 In 1976, the Court approved these new statutory death pen-
alty schemes in Gregg v. Georgia.37
The courts had no immediate opportunity to apply these cases to
the death penalty provision in the 1954 Espionage Act because the
Department of Justice took the official position that the Supreme
Court decisions had invalidated most of the federal death penalty pro-
visions, and thus declined to enforce them.38 When the Ninth Circuit
finally addressed the issue in 1984, it found the provision in the Espio-
nage Act deficient because "the Constitution ... requires legislative
guidelines in death penalty cases."39
B. The Restoration of the Death Penalty for Espionage in the
1994 Death Penalty Act
After several unsuccessful attempts, Congress finally restored the
federal death penalty in 1994. In an effort to comply with Furman, the
Federal Death Penalty Act imposes legislative guidelines for a number
of homicide and non-homicide capital crimes, including peacetime
espionage. 40 In effect, the Act creates two categories of capital peace-
35 1d. The Furman plurality consisted of five separate concurring opinions. Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White argued that the current statutory death penalty schemes were
unconstitutionally arbitrary. See id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall went further, maintaining that the death penalty for murder was an inherently cruel
and unusual punishment. See id. at 257-306 (Brennan,J., concurring); id. at 314-71 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
36 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-66 (1976) (plurality opinion).
37 Id. at 207 (plurality opinion).
38 See Paul D. Kamenar, Death Penalty Legislation for Espionage and Other Federal Crimes Is
Unnecessary: It Just Needs a Little Re-Enforcemen 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 881, 881 & n.3
(1989) (citing a Department ofJustice manual).
39 United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1984). The trial court
had not sentenced the defendant to death; rather, the defendant, charged with selling
national defense secrets to Poland, filed a writ of mandamus to challenge the trial court's
preliminary determination that the death penalty under the 1954 Espionage Act was con-
stitutional. The prosecution, in fact, agreed with the defendant that Furman had rendered
the death penalty provision of the Act unconstitutional, but argued unsuccessfully that
mandamus was improper in the case. Id. at 1217-18, 1221-24.
Oddly enough, the Justice Department reversed its stance against the death penalty
four years after the Harper decision, concluding that capital punishment may in fact be
permissible for "'narrowly drawn offenses against the United States and its officials.'"
Kamenar, supra note 38, at 882 n.7 (quoting 3(a) UNrrED STATES Arromu'rs' MANuAL § 9-
10.010 (1988)).
40 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 60003(a) (2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1968-69 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994)).
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time espionage. 41 The first category, present in earlier versions of the
1994 Death Penalty Act, permits the death penalty only when "the of-
fense... directly concern [s] nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or
satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retalia-
tion against large-scale attack; war plans; communications intelligence
or cryptographic information; or any other major weapons system or
major element of defense strategy."42
The second category arose in response to the arrest of Aldrich
Ames, labeled by one author as "Moscow's most valuable mole in the
entire history of the cold war."'43 Ames was a high-ranking CIA analyst
who had worked undetected for almost ten years as a spy for the KGB,
supplying the Soviet intelligence agency with the names of Russians
who were spying for the United States.44 The government alleged that
Ames's disclosures eviscerated America's intelligence operations
within the Soviet Union, and led directly to the deaths of several CIA
agents. 45 Unhappy with the inability to impose the death penalty on
criminals like Ames, 46 Congress added an amendment that made espi-
onage a capital crime when "the offense result[s] in the identification
41 These categories of capital espionage should not be confused with the aggravating
circumstances for the crime, which Congress set forth in the Federal Death Penalty Act. See
18 U.S.C. § 3592(b) (1994). The aggravating circumstances for capital espionage and trea-
son consist of: (a) prior convictions for treason or espionage, for which death or life in
prison was authorized; (b) knowingly creating a grave risk to national security; (c) know-
ingly creating a grave risk of death to another person; and (d) "any other aggravating
factor for which notice has been given." Id. After determining that a defendant is guilty of
a capital crime, the fact finder must (in a separate sentencing phase) consider all of the
possible aggravating circumstances, as well as the mitigating factors set forth in § 3592(a),
before determining whether the "imposition of a sentence of death is justified." Id.
§§ 3591, 3593 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
The categories of capital espionage, in contrast, come into play before the court con-
siders aggravating circumstances. After a defendant is found guilty of espionage, the jury
or court must determine whether his crime constitutes capital espionage. Id. § 794(a). If
so, the tribunal then shifts to the sentencing phase. In this sense, the capital espionage
designations are analogous to those in § 3591 (a) (2) for murder prosecutions, which re-
quire that the prosecution demonstrate certain mens rea elements before moving to the
capital sentencing phase. See id. § 3591 (a) (1)-(2).
42 Id. § 794(a); see also S. 114, 97th Cong. (1981) (containing similar language).
43 DAVID WISE, NIGHTMOVER: How ALDRICH AMEs SOLD THE CIA TO THE KGB FOR $4.6
MILLION, at 5 (1995).
44 See id. at 107-271; see also TIM WEINER ET AL.., BETRAYAL: THE STORY OF ALDRICH
AMES, AN AMERICAN Spy 26-252 (1995) (detailing Ames's crimes while working for the
CIA).
45 See WEINER ET AL., supra note 44, at 258-60; WISE, supra note 43, at 254-71.
46 See H.R. 4060, 103d Cong. (1994); 140 CONG. REc. H2225 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Stearns) (advocating death penalty for treason that "results in the death
of an agent acting on behalf of the United States" and citing Aldrich Ames case as an
example); see also 140 CONG. REC. S1820 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (using Ames case to support the Senate's version of a capital espionage bill).
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by a foreign power ... of an individual acting as an agent of the
United States and consequently in the death of that individual."47
II
Ti OBJEcTIvW-SuBJEcTrrE PROPORTIONALIY REVIEW OF
COKER V. GEORGIA
Coker v. Georgia48 is the benchmark case for adjudicating whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for crimes other
than murder.49 The defendant in Coker faced capital punishment for
a rape in which the victim was not killed. The plurality opinion, writ-
ten by Justice White, established a two-part inquiry for determining
whether capital punishment for a particular crime constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.50 First, the plurality used an "objective"
test, seeking "guidance in history and from the objective evidence...
concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty."5 1 Second, the plu-
rality applied a "subjective" test, using its own judgment to test the
severity of the death penalty in relation to other crimes for which the
47 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).
48 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
49 Many commentators have used Coker as a springboard to discuss the constitutional
viability of the death penalty for non-murder capital crimes, including drug trafficking,
treason, and child rape. See, e.g., Eric Pinkard, The Death Penalty forDrugKingpins: Constitu-
tional and International Implications, 24 VT. L. Rv. 1 (1999); Neil C. Schur, Assessing the
Constitutionality and Policy Implications of the 1994 Drug Kingpin Death Penalty, 2 TEx. F. ON
C.L. & C.R. 141 (1996); Wilson, supra note 19;J. Chandler Bailey, Note, Death is Different,
Even on the Bayou: The Disproportionality of Crime and Punishment in Louisiana's Capital Child
Rape Statute 55 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1335 (1998); Meryl P. Diamond, Note, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1159 (1999); Annaliese
Flynn Fleming, Comment, Louisiana's Newest Capital Cime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape,
89 J. QuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1999); Elizabeth Gray, Comment, Death Penalty and
Child Rape: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 42 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1443 (1998); PamelaJ. Lor-
mand, Comment, Proportionate Sentencing for Rape of a Minor The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73
TuL L. REv. 981 (1999); Emily Marie Moeller, Comment, Devolving Standards of Decency:
Using the Death Penalty to Punish Child Rapists, 102 DIcK. L. REV. 621 (1998); Bridgette M.
Palmer, Note, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Considering One State's
Current Law, 15 GA. ST. U. L. Rxv. 843 (1999); David W. Schaaf, Note, What if the Victim Is a
Child? Examining the Constitutionality of Louisiana's Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REv. 347. See generallyJeffreyJ. Matura, Note, When Will It Stop? The Use of the Death
Penalty for Non-Homicide Crimes, 24J. LEGIS. 249 (1998) (discussing the constitutional impli-
cations of statutes that authorize the death penalty for non-homicide crimes).
50 Although the plurality opinion garnered the support of only four Justices, two of
the concurringJustices, Brennan and Marshall, wrote separately to reaffirm their view that
the death penalty constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in all circumstances. Coker,
433 U.S. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600-01 (Marshall, J., concurring). Thus,
the plurality's less sweeping conclusion that the death penalty for rape was unconstitu-
tional effectively garnered the support of six Justices. See id. at 612 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (acknowledging that the plurality's opinion is "the view of this Court"); see also id.
at 601-03 (PowellJ., concurring in part dissenting in part) (agreeing with the holding on
the facts of the case but arguing that the death penalty could be appropriate in certain
cases of aggravated rape).
51 Id. at 593 (plurality opinion).
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Court has upheld the use of the death penalty.5 2 Using this two-part
test, the Coker plurality decided that the death penalty was an uncon-
stitutional punishment for the rape of an adult woman.53
A. Facts of Coker
Serving time for several violent offenses, including murder and
kidnapping, Eldrich Coker escaped from a Georgia state prison in
1974. He broke into the home of a nearby couple, Allen and Elnita
Carver. Coker threatened Mrs. Carver with a knife and raped her in
the presence of her husband. He then drove away in the Carver's
automobile, forcing Mrs. Carver to accompany him. Soon thereafter,
the police apprehended Coker, who had not harmed Mrs. Carver af-
ter the rape. 54
The state tried and convicted Coker, inter alia, for raping Mrs.
Carver. Georgia law permitted the death penalty for rape if the jury
found at least one of three statutory aggravating circumstances.5 5 At
Coker's sentencing hearing the jury found two aggravating circum-
stances: his previous record and his robbery of the victim. The jury
returned a verdict of death by electrocution. 56
B. The Objective Proportionality Test
The Coker plurality sought to determine whether the death pen-
alty for rape was "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime," and thus unconstitutional. 57 To this end, the plurality began
by reviewing two types of objective evidence relating to the severity of
Georgia's punishment for rape.
52 See id at 597-99 (plurality opinion).
53 Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
54 Id. at 587 (plurality opinion).
55 Georgia held that the following circumstances could make rape a capital crime:
(1) the rape was committed by a "person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony," (2) the rape was committed "while the offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony, or aggravated battery," and (3) the rape was "outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim." Id. at 587 n.3 (plurality opinion) (citing the relevant Georgia
statute).
56 Specifically, the defendant's prior murder conviction and the jury's finding that
the rape was committed in the course of an armed robbery provided the two aggravating
circumstances. See id. at 587-91 (plurality opinion).
57 Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). The Court noted that Gregg v. Georgia established a
separate ground for invalidating the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment-if the
punishment "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffer-
ing." Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion)). Although the plurality did not discuss this element of Gregg in Goker, it did observe
that the objective unpopularity of capital punishment undermined the "claim that the
death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the States' criminal justice system." Id. at
592 n.4 (plurality opinion).
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First, the plurality surveyed the use of the death penalty in the
other forty-nine states and in the federal government, and discovered
that Georgia was the only jurisdiction in the country to that allowed
capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman.58 The plurality
also noted that the "climate of international opinion" disfavored capi-
tal punishment for rapists.59 The court concluded that these factors
"weigh[ ] very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a
suitable penalty for raping an adult woman."60 Second, the plurality
reviewed Georgia's recent sentencing decisions in rape cases. After
noting that juries are a "'significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values,"' 61 the plurality found that they had not im-
posed death "in the vast majority of cases. '62
The Court later adopted a third objective criterion for propor-
tionality review: the historical use of the death penalty for particular
crimes.63 Under this approach, the Court considers the death penalty
from the Framers' perspective. 64 The underlying theory is that "the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment em-
braces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had
been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights
was adopted";65 or in other words, "those practices condemned by the
common law in 1789."66 In practice, because of the common law's
liberal approval of the death penalty,67 the Court has rarely had the
58 See id. at 593-96 (plurality opinion).
59 Id- at 596 & n.10 (plurality opinion); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796
n.22 (1982) (including "international opinion" as an objective indicia).
60 Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (plurality opinion).
61 Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion)); see also
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788 (including "the sentencing decisions juries have made" as an
objective indicia).
62 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
63 The dissent, in fact, raised this point in Coker, noting that "since the turn of this
century... more than one-third of American jurisdictions have consistently provided the
death penalty for rape" and criticizing the plurality's "focus on the experience of the im-
mediate past" Id. at 614 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
64 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983).
65 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986). In Solem the Court explained:
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go
beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of
the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide
at least the same protection-including the right to be free from excessive
punishments.
463 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
66 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406.
67 Blackstone recognized 160 crimes under English law "worthy of instant death." 4
WILLIAM BLAcysroNE, COMMENTARIES *18. Due to the profligacy of capital statutes during
the eighteenth century, this may have been a conservative estimate. See LEON RADZINOWICZ,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRuMNAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 3-5 (1948).
The list of potentially capital crimes in the late eighteenth century included, inter alia,
marking coins, "cutting... hop-binds growing on poles," pocket-picking, and "being in the
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opportunity to invoke historical use as a bar under the objective pro-
portionality test.68
C. The Subjective Proportionality Test
The Coher plurality insisted that objective evidence was not wholly
dispositive, because "the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the ac-
ceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."69 To
this end, the plurality created a subjective analysis, attempting to dis-
cern whether capital punishment for rape was a "disproportionate
penalty."70
Beyond the disproportionate criterion, the Coker plurality failed
to expound on the exact nature of the subjective test. In practice the
plurality's analysis was comparative, examining rape in relation to
murder, a crime for which the plurality had recently held the death
penalty permissible, and thus proportionate, under the Eighth
Amendment.71 The plurality acknowledged that rape was indeed a
terrible crime: "Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of
self.' ' '72 Yet the plurality also stressed that rape, "in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,"73 is inher-
ently less severe than murder, which involves "the unjustified taking of
human life."' 74 In contrast to murder, "rape by definition does not in-
clude the death of or even the serious injury to another person."7 5
Refusing to create the possibility that a convicted rapist could be pun-
ished by death while a convicted murderer could live, the plurality
determined that capital punishment for rape was unduly severe and
thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 76
The plurality similarly dispatched arguments that aggravating fac-
tors such as prior convictions and the concurrent commission of other
crimes could nevertheless justify the death penalty for rape, noting
that "[n]either of these circumstances, nor both of them together,
change our conclusion that the death sentence imposed ... is a dis-
company of gypsies." Id. at 10-11 (surveying the capital statutes of the eighteenth century
in England).
68 But see Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-10 (ruling that the execution of the insane violates the
Eighth Amendment under the historical use approach).
69 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
70 Id. (plurality opinion).
71 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion).
72 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
73 Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
74 Id. (plurality opinion) ("Life is over for the victim of the murderer, for the rape
victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not
beyond repair.").
75 Id. (plurality opinion).
76 Id. at 600 (plurality opinion).
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proportionate punishment for rape."77 The plurality emphasized that
prior convictions, even convictions for capital crimes, "do not change
the fact that the instant crime being punished is a rape not involving
the taking of life." 78 Likewise, the plurality insisted that the commis-
sion of a concurrent crime could not justify the death penalty unless
that concurrent crime was itself deemed "deserving of the death
penalty."79
Commentators and courts have generally agreed that the Coker
decision prohibits the death penalty for crimes against individuals that
do not involve the taking of another human life, such as kidnapping8 °
or the rape of a child.81 Since Coker, the Supreme Court has not
found any crime subjectively proportionate to the crime of murder for
purposes of allowing the imposition of the death penalty.8 2
III
OBjEcriVE PROPORTONAInY REVEW OF THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR PEACETIME ESPIONAGE
The Cokersystem of proportionality review emphasized the impor-
tance of considering objective criteria in determining whether the
death penalty is an unconstitutionally excessive punishment.8 3 Al-
though the basic principles of Coker's objective test are applicable to
the crime of espionage, the nature of this crime requires the propor-
tionality inquiry to proceed by analogy.
A. Co-Sovereigns
The first principle of objective proportionality analysis concerns
the policies of a jurisdiction's co-sovereigns. In Coker, the plurality
dealt with a state law, and thus could compare Georgia's death penalty
77 Id. at 599 (plurality opinion).
78 Id. (plurality opinion).
79 Coker's concurrent capital crime was armed robbery, a crime for which Georgia
statutes authorized the death penalty. The jury, however, gave Coker a separate life sen-
tence for this crime. Id. (plurality opinion).
The plurality acknowledged that murder as a concurrent crime to rape could be "de-
serving of the death penalty." Id. at 599 & n.16 (plurality opinion). Resolving the constitu-
tional difficulties with this possibility, however, was academic because the state, if such a
case arose, could simply try the defendant separately for the murder. Id. at 599 n.16 (plu-
rality opinion).
80 Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam), vacating in part 206 S.E.2d
12 (Ga. 1974) (upholding death sentence for convicted kidnapper and rapist).
81 See Lormand, supra note 49, at 996; Moeller, supra note 49, at 633; Schaaf, supra
note 49, at 349. But see State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1259 (1997) (upholding Louisiana law permitting the death penalty for child rapists).
82 But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (upholding death penalty for
participant in felony murder despite a lack of intent to kill).
83 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592-96 (plurality opinion).
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policy with those of the other forty-nine states.84 Yet peacetime espio-
nage is only a crime under federal law and is not subject to the same
state-by-state inquiry.85
By analogy to the Coker analysis, however, one could compare the
United States federal government's punishment for peacetime espio-
nage with that of other nations. 86 Many countries, including some
that prohibit the death penalty for "ordinary crimes" such as murder,
still allow capital punishment for extraordinary crimes "under military
law or... committed in exceptional circumstances such as wartime."8 7
Peacetime espionage, however, often does not qualify as a sufficiently
extraordinary crime in these jurisdictions.88 Notably, even countries
that do allow expansive use of the death penalty for both ordinary and
extraordinary crimes have been reluctant to include peacetime espio-
nage as a capital crime. 89 Moreover, the international trend favors
abolishing the death penalty for all crimes, extraordinary or not.90 For
84 See id. at 593-96 (plurality opinion).
85 Under the principles of federalism, however, individual states retain the power to
proscribe other crimes against the state, as opposed to crimes against the United States. See
Hus-r, supra note 26, at 134. As of 1993, for example, three states (California, Georgia,
Louisiana) still included treason against the state as a death penalty crime. See THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AmERiCA 36-37 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). No one has faced execution for
a crime against an individual state since at least 1930. See id. at 7.
86 Cokeritself noted that the "climate of international opinion concerning the accepta-
bility of a particular punishment" was "not irrelevant" in a proportionality analysis. 433
U.S. at 596 n.10 (plurality opinion) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (noting
that only three out of sixty "major nations" allowed the death penalty for rape)); see also A
Bill to Establish Constitutional Procedures for the Imposition of the Sentence of Death, and for Other
Purposes: Hearing on S. 114 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 24-25 (1981)
[hereinafter Capital Punishment Hearings] (letter from Michael W. Dolan, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs) (arguing that imposing the death penalty
for treason was not excessive under Coker because of its international acceptance).
87 Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (as of O1
April 1999) [hereinafter Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries], at http://ww.amnesty-
usa.org/abolish/abret.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001). Major countries that have abol-
ished the death penalty for ordinary crimes but retained it for "extraordinary" offenses
include Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and Mexico. Id.
88 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 177 n.15 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that Cyprus, El Salvador, and Argentina "have abolished lthe death penalty] for all
crimes except those committed in wartime or in violation of military law").
89 See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, China: No One Is Safe, ch. 5, at http://www.amnesty.org/
ailib/intcam/china/china96/report/cc5.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) (noting that
China, which regularly uses capital punishment for over sixty-eight offenses including
theft, "seriously disrupting public order," and bigamy); id. ch. 1, at http://
w"vw.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/china/china96/report/ccl.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001)
(explaining that China's law did not allow punishment for stealing state secrets until 1993,
and that the penalty has never been carried out).
90 Since 1994, for example, Canada, Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (all
of which had initially retained capital punishment for certain "extraordinary crimes") have
abolished the death penalty for all crimes. See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra
note 87.
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these reasons, the weight of international opinion disfavors the death
penalty for peacetime espionage.
B. Contemporary Values
The second principle of objective proportionality analysis con-
cerns the contemporary values found within the jurisdiction. Coker
sought to evaluate contemporary values by analyzing Georgia's jury
verdicts in rape cases eligible for the death penalty.91 A parallel analy-
sis is impossible for peacetime espionage because no jury in the
United States has ever considered imposing the death penalty for this
crime. Of course, the very fact that no federal prosecutor orjudge has
pursued or allowed a capital trial on a peacetime espionage charge
may itself be some indication of the country's contemporary values.
As noted previously, however, the reluctance to seek the death penalty
may stem more from national security and ex post facto concerns than
from value judgments of federal officials.92 In any case, a precise anal-
ysis of espionage under this method suffers from a small sample size.93
Other indicia of contemporary values, however, have demon-
strated that support for the death penalty for peacetime espionage is
lukewarm at best. The last Gallup poll to address the question, in
1988, revealed that only 43% of Americans supported the death pen-
alty for peacetime espionage. 94 Significantly more respondents fa-
vored the death penalty not only for murder (79%), but for other
non-homicidal crimes such as attempting to assassinate the President
(63%), hijacking an airplane (49%), and even rape (51%) 95-a crime
for which the Supreme Court had already found capital punishment
objectively disproportionate. During the debate over an earlier ver-
sion of the Death Penalty Act, the Department of Justice objected to
the institution of the death penalty for peacetime espionage, 96 while
at the same time defending the restoration of the death penalty for
murder, treason, and wartime espionage. 97 Contemporary values,
91 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 (plurality opinion).
92 See supra notes 14-15.
93 Only sixteen espionage cases arose under federal civilian law between 1994 and
2000. In at least a few of these cases, however, the conduct of the defendant did not
amount to capital espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). See, e.g., sources cited supra note
13.
94 GALLup, supra note 19, at 256.
95 Ik at 258.
96 See Capital Punishment Hearings, supra note 86, at 25 (letter from Michael W. Dolan,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs) (stating that "[w]hile the
Department [ofJustice] does not view... the death penalty unconstitutionally excessive in
relation to the offense of peacetime espionage, we do believe that as a matter of policy,
serious consideration should be given to deleting the death penalty... under 18 U.S.C.
§ 794(a)").
97 See id. at 23-33.
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thus, do not provide any bedrock of support for capital peacetime es-
pionage offenses.
C. Historical Use
The third principle of objective proportionality review concerns
the historical use of the death penalty. In effect, this prong asks
whether the death penalty would offend the drafters of the Eighth
Amendment,98 based on standards of cruel and unusual punishment
under the common law in 1789. 99 Indeed, supporters of the capital
espionage statutes have claimed that crimes such as espionage and
treason have traditionally merited the death penalty.'00
This belief is certainly half true. Treason has been a capital crime
throughout the history of the United States,' 0 ' and death was usually
the least of the punishments imposed on traitors under the common
law. 10 2 The common law in 1789, however, did not recognize espio-
nage as a separate felony meriting the death penalty;10 3 nor did early
98 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983).
99 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
100 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8499 (daily ed. June 24, 1991) (Statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[T]here has always been a Federal death penalty for non-homicide offenses.... [D]eath
has always been the traditional and accepted punishment for treason, as well as for some
forms of espionage.").
101 See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAw OF TREASON 35 (1964) (noting the 1776
execution for treason of Thomas Hickey, a member of General George Washington's per-
sonal guard); HuRsT, supra note 26, at 68-82 (chronicling the colonial laws against treason,
most of which mandate the death penalty). In one of its first Acts, Congress permitted the
death penalty for persons convicted of treason against the United States. Act of April 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994)); JuLES
ARCHER, TREASON IN AMERICA 23-24 (1971). Treason remains a capital crime under mod-
ern-day 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
102 "The Great Statute of Treasons, enacted in England in 1352, has served as the
landmark legislation that defines the crime of treason." Ralph M. Carney, The Enemy
Within: A Social History of Treason, in CITIZEN ESPIONAGE 19, 27 (Theodore R. Sarbin et al.
eds., 1994). The law saved the most gruesome and terrible punishments for traitors. In a
mutilation ceremony designed to obviate the possibility of spiritual redemption, the traitor
was dragged behind a horse to the place of execution, hung, cut down while still alive,
disemboweled, beheaded, and then drawn and quartered. Id. at 26. Perhaps even more
severe than the physical punishment was the "lasting social punishment" involving the trai-
tor's forfeiture of property and the resulting disinheritance of his heirs. Id. at 26, 29.
These punishments were still used in England during the time of Blackstone and the fram-
ing of the Constitution. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *92-*93.
103 See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *94-*118. Blackstone recognized a
number of lesser felonies under the English law, besides treason, "injurious to the king's
prerogative." Id. at *94-*101. These offenses included mutilation of coinage, id. at
*98-*100, killing, attempting to kill, or assaulting members of the king's council, id. at
*100, leaving the realm and entering the military service of a foreign state, id at
*100-*101, "imbezzling the king's armour or warlike stores," id. at *101 (emphasis in origi-
nal), deserting the army in times of war, id., and praemunire (allegiance to the pope), id.
at *102-*118. None of these lesser crimes, however, encompassed peacetime espionage.
Persons found guilty of these lesser felonies against the king, moreover, were usually per-
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American legislation proscribe espionage specifically as either a felony
or a misdemeanor. 10 4
The drafters of the Eighth Amendment, moreover, would not
have categorized peacetime espionage as a type of treason. Certainly,
as one commentator has noted, "[b] oth in its general usage and in
English legal history, 'treason' has at one time or another embraced
about everything which could fairly be called subversive activity, and a
good deal that could not be."'10 5 Yet even in the eighteenth century,
the law recognized substantive limits on the scope of treason, 10 6 one
of which was a requirement that the party benefiting from the treason
be an enemy-defined as a subject of foreign powers with whom we
are openly at war.10 7 The Treason Clause of the American Constitu-
tion embodies these same restrictions.108 While espionage committed
in peacetime may have constituted a lesser crime from the perspective
of the Founders, 0 9 it was not a felony punishable by death. Com-
bined with the other Coker factors, therefore, the historical-use prong
weighs against the death penalty for peacetime espionage under the
objective proportionality analysis.
IV
SUBJECTIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR PEAcwnvm ESPIONAGE
A. The Necessity of a Two-Pronged Comparison
In its subjective proportionality analysis, the Coker plurality com-
pared rape with murder, a crime for which the Court had previously
upheld the use of the death penalty." 0 The Cokerplurality found that
because the crime of rape is inherently less severe than murder, exe-
mitted the "benefit of clergy" after a first offense, meaning that they could avoid the death
penalty. See id. at *98-:101.
104 SeeAct of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 112-19 (listing treason (§1), misprision
of treason (§2), forgery (§ 14), and other crimes against the state, but making no mention
of espionage).
105 HuRsr, supra note 26, at 150-51.
106 See ARCHER, supra note 101, at 1-2.
107 See 4 BLACFSTONE, supra note 67, at *83.
108 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3 ("Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
109 Blackstone recognized a category of offenses called "misprisions," defined as "all
such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon." 4
BLACtsrONE, supra note 67, at *119. Among these offenses were a broad category of "mis-
prisions against the king's person and government" that encompassed "doing anything
that may tend to . . .weaken [the king's] government." Id. at 123. The first Congress
legislated "misprision of treason" as a misdemeanor offense. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch.
9, § 2, 1 Stat. 112, 112.
lO See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
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cuting rapists is unconstitutionally severe because murderers can es-
cape the same penalty."' 1
To what extent, if at all, is the Coker subjective comparison of rape
with murder applicable to crimes against the security of the state such
as espionage and treason? Commentators have reached different an-
swers to this question. Some argue that crimes against the security of
the state should be held to the same "murder standard" employed in
Coker.i 12 Under this standard, political crimes may be capital offenses
if they rise to the level of murder; that is, if they caused a death.113
Others maintain that the Coker analysis applies only to crimes against
the security of individuals, and that crimes such as treason and espio-
nage need not be compared with murder under a subjective propor-
tionality analysis. 114
This Note does not adopt the viewpoint that subjective propor-
tionality comparisons are wholly inapplicable to espionage. That ap-
proach ignores a central concern of the Coker decision: avoiding
sentencing discrepancies between crimes of different severities. 1 5 At
the same time, however, this Note does not view murder as the only
crime appropriate for subjective comparison under a Coker analysis.
The crime of treason, like murder, has incurred the death penalty
throughout the history of England and America. 1 6 Just as murder is
considered the most serious crime against the security of an individ-
ual,117 treason is considered the most serious crime against the secur-
ity of the state."18 Although no person has faced execution for
111 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (plurality opinion).
112 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 19, at 160-61, 173-79; Matura, supra note 49, at 260-62.
113 See Wilson, supra note 19, at 173-79 (proposing a compromise "aggravated treason"
statute, which would punish traitors only when they intended, and actually caused, an-
other's death); see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
plurality's decision "casts serious doubt upon the constitutional validity of statutes impos-
ing the death penalty ... [for crimes that] may not necessarily result in any immediate
death," including treason).
114 See, e.g., Kamenar, supra note 38, at 888 (noting that "[the availability of the death
penalty [for espionage] even in the absence of immediate death satisfies the criteria speci-
fied by the Coker Court"); Charles C. Boettcher, Note, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-98 (1994): United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998), 29
TEx. TECH L. REv. 1043, 1061 (1998) ("Although the holding of Coker implied that any
sentence of death for a non-homicide offense would be unconstitutional, treason and espi-
onage are still viewed to be exceptions to this holding because of their historical precedent
and significant impact on society.").
115 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (plurality opinion) ("It is difficult to accept the notion,
and we do not, that the rapist, with or without aggravating circumstances, should be pun-
ished more heavily than the deliberate killer. .. ").
116 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
117 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
118 See, e.g., Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) ("Treason is the
most serious offense that may be committed against the United States, and its gravity is
emphasized by the fact that it is the only crime defined by the Constitution." (citations
omitted)); 4 BLAcESrONE, supra note 67, at *75 (labeling treason "the highest civil crime").
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treason in the United States since at least 1859,119 and despite recent
criticisms of the constitutionality of the death penalty for treason, 2 0
an analysis of espionage must assume, absent any direct authority to
the contrary, that treason is still a viable capital crime.
The subjective analysis in this Note, therefore, requires two per-
spectives: one comparing capital espionage crimes to murder, and the
other comparing them to treason. The question in each is the same:
is capital punishment for espionage disproportionate according to the
logic that makes the penalty proportionate for murder and treason?
B. Espionage Compared to Murder
1. Espionage Jeopardizing National Security
Section 794(a) makes espionage punishable by death when "the
offense... directly concern[s] nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft
or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retali-
ation against large-scale attack; war plans; communications intelli-
gence or cryptographic information; or any other major weapons
system or major element of defense strategy."' 2 1 Proponents of this
statute have argued that an offender who reveals national security in-
formation could potentially cause harm to individuals far surpassing
the harm caused by an individual murder, and that such a grave of-
fense thus merits the death penalty under the Coker rationale. 122
One must question, however, whether those who commit crimes
against the security of the state harbor the same culpability "in terms
of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the pub-
lic' 23 as do murderers. James Wilson notes that the law ordinarily
does not punish non-homicide crimes on the basis of their danger to
society as a whole.'2 4 Those who knowingly violate antitrust laws, for
example, do not face the death penalty, despite the "widespread viola-
tions of the public's rights, which cause more total injury than... a
single murder."'2 5 Moreover, the evil of crimes such as treason and
espionage is often in the eye of the beholder. Wilson suggests that
119 Wilson, supra note 19, at 156. The 1859 execution was that of the abolitionistJohn
Brown, whom the State of Virginia had also convicted on charges on conspiracy and first-
degree murder. See ARcHER, supra note 101, at 51-53.
120 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 19.
121 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
122 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. H2225 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Steams) (claiming that "acts of treachery" such as espionage have "long-term and damag-
ing effects... on our country's national security"); see also Bazan, supra note 15, at 617 ("It
might therefore be argued that a person who commits the most serious forms of espio-
nage, by putting the nation at risk, has engaged in conduct warranting the ultimate
penalty.").
123 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion).
124 See Wilson, supra note 19, at 160.
125 Id.
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"'[t]reason' ... may be the act of a patriot."1 26 Similarly, a spy might
share military secrets with a foreign country based on his or her own
individual notions of justice. 127
This debate, however, sidesteps a fundamental precept of the
Coker analysis. The concern under subjective proportionality is not
the potential harm of a crime, but the actual harm inherent in the
crime "by definition," as provided by statute. 128 In Coker, for example,
the plurality stated that "[rape] does not compare to murder" because
although it might be accompanied by another crime, "rape by defini-
tion does not include the death of [the victim]."129 The Coker plural-
ity, thus, disavowed speculative inquiry into the possible-as distinct
from the inherent-harm stemming from a given crime.
As defined in § 794(a), espionage does not require a showing of
death, or any other actual harm to the national security.'30 In fact,
espionage prosecutions often lack either evidence of significant attrib-
utable harm to the country or a specific individual.131 The imposition
of a harm requirement, however, would not solve these deficiencies
126 Id. at 161. According to James Wilson:
All traitors can claim that their actions would benefit the populace in the
long run. If their defense is a belief in Marxism or fascism, does that ideo-
logical commitment make their defense a 'moral justification' which is 'rea-
sonable,' and is that belief one that is an 'ordinary standard of morality'?
Or does the 'ordinary standard' test reallyjustify execution of anyone who
does not have the views of the average citizen? The meaning of this mish-
mash of words is unknown.
Id. at 167.
127 See, e.g., RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 450-52 (arguing that the Rosenbergs'
espionage was motivated by their sincere belief in the values and goals of the Communist
Party); Peter Perl, The Spy Who's Been Left in the Cold, WASH. POsT MAG.,July 5, 1998, at 9, 10
(discussing the political motives forJonathan Pollard's betrayal of American intelligence to
Israel).
128 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality opinion).
129 Id. (plurality opinion). But compare id. (plurality opinion) with id. at 612 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting):
Rape is not a mere physical attack-it is destructive of the human personal-
ity. The remainder of the victim's life may be gravely affected, and this in
turn may have a serious detrimental effect upon her husband and any chil-
dren she may have.... [R] ecovery from such a gross assault on the human
personality is not healed by medicine or surgery. To speak blandly, as the
plurality does, of rape victims who are 'unharmed,' . . . takes too little ac-
count of the profound suffering the crime imposes upon the victims and
their loved ones.
Id. at 612 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 603 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part dissenting in part) (criticizing the plurality for ignoring the "wide variation in
the effect on the victim" following rape).
130 See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
1'1 See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing a conviction for, inter alia, conspiracy to commit espionage despite evidence that the
military information in question was already available to the general public), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 1601 (2001); RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 449 (quoting a high-ranking
General working with the Atomic Energy Commission who believed that "the data that
went out in the case of the Rosenbergs was of minor value").
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for two reasons: trials for political crimes may take place before the
extent of any harm can be determined, and the actual causation of
injury connected with crimes against the security of the state is often
impossible to determine. 3 2 Thus, by its own definition and nature,
capital espionage jeopardizing national security cannot meet the mur-
der standard used in Coker.
2. Espionage Resulting in the Death of a Foreign Agent
a. The Enmund-Tison Standard
Section 794(a) also makes espionage punishable by death when
"the offense result[s] in the identification by a foreign power... of an
individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in
the death of that individual." 133 This requirement that the capital es-
pionage crime leads to a death conforms to language in Coker that
limits the death penalty under the murder comparison to crimes "in-
volving the taking of life.'u3 4 Thus, capital espionage resulting in the
death of a foreign agent could be regarded as the subjective
equivalent of murder because both involve "the ultimate violation of
self"'35 -the killing of a human being.
But does this type of capital espionage involve the same "moral
depravity and.., injury to [a] person and to the public"' 36 as murder?
Following Coker, the Supreme Court established that not all crimes
resulting in the death of an individual are equal to murder in terms of
eligibility for the death penalty. In Enmund v. Florida,137 the Supreme
Court held that despite his participation in a robbery in which two
persons were killed, the defendant could not be sentenced to death if
he "did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing
took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder."1 38
132 See Wilson, supra note 19, at 167 (noting that these same difficulties would exist in
the context of treason prosecutions).
133 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). Moral outrage over the death of an individual similar to that
involved with murder appears to have motivated the passage of the bill. See, e.g., 140 CONG.
REc. H2225 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Steams) ("When [espionage] re-
sults in the death of an agent acting on behalf of the United States, such a betrayal be-
comes even more heinous [than other types of espionage]."). In fact, Congress passed this
version of capital espionage in favor of another bill that would have capitally punished only
espionage that created "a grave risk of death to another person." See 140 CONG. REc. S1820
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (remarks of Senator Hatch) (referring to the other version of the
bill).
134 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion).
135 Id. (plurality opinion).
136 Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
137 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
138 Id. at 795. The Court's extensive discussion of the Coker proportionality analysis
indicates that it did not intend to restrict its ruling to felony murder alone. Lynn D. Wit-
tenbrink, Note, Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony
Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. REv. 817, 829 (1988).
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Many commentators suggested that the Court had promulgated a
bright-line "specific intent" rule for eligible death penalty murders.139
Five years later, however, in Tison v. Arizona14 0 -another felony-
murder case-the Court held that a defendant who does not specifi-
cally intend another's death may nevertheless be executed if guilty of
"major participation [in a crime involving a death], combined with
reckless indifference to human life."1 41 Although the Court's standard
for "major participation" was not entirely clear, the Court stressed the
importance of the defendant's presence at the scene of the murder.1 42
b. Application of the Standard to Espionage
Section 794(a) imposes no requirement that the spy specifically
intend the death of any American agent(s).1 43 Nor would an individ-
ual case under the Espionage Act be likely to meet the Enmund stan-
dard. Aldrich Ames-the only example available for study-was
apparently indifferent to the fates of the agents whose identities he
revealed to the Russian government. 44 His motivations-$2.7 million
in payment from the KGB, 145 political disaffection, 146 and perhaps the
thrill of being an important spy' 47-were unrelated to a conscious de-
sire to see American agents killed. He neither "committed homicide"
nor participated in a deliberate "plot or scheme to murder.' 148
139 See, e.g., Laura L. Kerton, Note, Enmund v. Florida: The Constitutionality of Imposing
the Death Penalty upon a Co-Felon in Felony Murder, 32 DEPAUL L. REv. 713, 734 (1983);John
C. Shawde, Note, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MiAMI L. REv.
357, 370 (1984). But see Deborah Sachs, Note, Cabana v. Bullock: The Proper Tibunal-The
Supreme Court Revisits Enmund v. Florida, 40 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1023, 1031 (1986) (stating
that the Enmund Court did not articulate an explicit standard for the requisite level of
intent).
140 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
141 Id. at 158.
142 See id.; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795 (explaining that most juries have not im-
posed the death penalty when, among other things, the defendant was not present at the
scene of the murder).
143 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
144 See Interview by CNN with Aldrich Ames (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter Ames Interview]
(claiming that he and his Russian contacts "never discussed the issue of what would be
done with the names"), at http://vwnw.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/experience/spies/
interviews/ames (last visited Oct. 20, 2001); see also WISE, supra note 43, at 320-25 (provid-
ing other motives for Ames's betrayals).
145 WISE, supra note 43, at 325 (noting that Ames had been promised an additional
$1.9 million for his services).
146 Id. at 324; Ames Interview, supra note 144.
147 WIsE, supra note 43, at 324-25 ("It seems clear that working for the Russians, quite
aside from the money, was fulfilling some deep psychological need in Ames. They treated
him like a hero."); see also WEINER Er AL., supra note 44, at 289 (stating that Ames "loved the
life of a spy").
148 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795 (1982).
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Recklessness, 149 however, would not be hard to prove in a case
involving a spy who betrayed American agents living in a country that
routinely executed "moles." The prosecution would only need to
prove that which Aldrich Ames later admitted: that he "knew quite
well, when [he] gave the names of our agents.., that [he] was expos-
ing them to the full machinery of counterespionage and the law, and
then prosecution and capital punishment."150 Barring unusual cir-
cumstances, then, a case involving espionage which causes the death
of a foreign agent would probably fail the Enmund standard of pur-
poseful intent, but meet Tison's recklessness standard.
Yet Tison also requires that the actor be a "major participant" in
the crime leading to the death. 151 The application of this rule in an
espionage case is uncertain. A spy like Ames who essentially works
alone rather than within a larger spy ring is clearly a major-indeed,
the only-participant in the crime.152 But unlike murder, no one can
commit espionage alone. Ames, for example, could not have pro-
vided the names of American agents and subsequently caused their
deaths without the help of his "handlers" in the United States, the
KGB, or the executioners in Russia.153 Thus, if major participation is
interpreted relatively, the independent actions of others involved in
the espionage might mitigate the major participant's individual moral
responsibility.15 4
Even if Tison's major participation standard does not involve rela-
tive comparisons, 155 it does appear at least to require the defendant's
physical presence at the scene of the killing.156 The Tison Court
stressed this factor when distinguishing the holding in Enmund, where
the defendant was waiting in a getaway car away from the scene of the
killing.157
149 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (c) (1962) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.").
150 Ames Interview, supra note 144.
151 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
152 Ames's wife, Rosario, was also implicated in Ames's espionage crimes. She received
a sixty-three month jail sentence. WEINER ET AL., supra note 44, at 288.
153 See WISE, supra note 43, 107-26, 254-71 (describing the roles of Ames's handlers in
the United States and of the KGB in Russia).
154 See David McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the En-
mund and Tison Standards, 32 Amiz. ST. L.J. 843, 875-76 (2000) (outlining the standard for
relative comparisons under the "major participation" inquiry).
155 Id. (arguing that the Tison "major participation" standard must at least partially
incorporate an "absolute sense of whether the defendant's actions were significant to the
completion of the [crime]").
156 See id. at 876 ("[T]he court likely meant 'major participation' to mean significant
participation plus presence at the murder scene, unless the defendant's role is dwarfed by
that of the other accomplice(s).").
157 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1987); Enmund v. Florida 458 U.S. 782,
783-85 (1982). But see Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and
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On remand in Tison, the prosecution eventually decided to drop
the death penalty for the same reason: it "had no conclusive proof
that [the defendants] were even present at the scene of the
murders."'158 David McCord notes that this distinction carries substan-
tial weight, for "the defendant's presence gives him an opportunity to
act as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant
fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably
more at fault for the resulting murders." 159
Even more so than an accomplice absent from the scene of a rob-
bery or murder, a spy like Aldrich Ames lacks control over executions
that take place thousands of miles away under the orders of a foreign
government. Although responsible for identifying the foreign agents
in the first place, Ames had no further ability to influence the deci-
sions of the KGB or to stop the executions of the agents. 160 In this
sense, espionage under § 7 94(a) lacks the continuing moral depravity
inherent in Tison's major participant standard.
Finally, evaluating the moral depravity of a spy against the moral
depravity of a murderer requires the consideration of one factor not
addressed in Enmund or Tison. Whereas felony-murder victims are
usually innocent victims of violent crime, the agents implicated under
§ 794(a) are, in all likelihood, spies who are betraying their own coun-
try.161 The Aldrich Ames case illustrates the irony that this situation
creates: the same people who condemn Ames's crime praise the ef-
forts of the spies he condemned. 162 In other words, the depravity of
betraying agents, unlike murder but like treason and other espionage
crimes, is relative to the observer. 163 This fact does not excuse the spy
who sells out his fellow agents. Rather, it demonstrates that the capi-
tal espionage crimes under § 794(a), if constitutional under a moral
depravity standard, must be justified not by a proportionality review in
relation to crimes against individuals, but in relation to crimes against
the security of the state itself.
the Non-Triggerman: The Scales ofJustice Are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. R~v. 123, 132-37 (1989)
(arguing that Tison's elimination of the intent standard essentially overrules Enmund).
158 McCord, supra note 154, at 874.
159 Id. at 873.
160 See WIsE, supra note 43, at 265 (disputing Ames's contention that he was able to
protect some of the agents he revealed to the KGB, stating that "[i] t was a novel claim, that
one could turn over the name of a Russian CIA agent to the KGB on condition that they be
left alone"); see also WEINER ET AL., supra note 44, at 280 (noting the "KGB's lack of cool-
headedness in killing the men" Ames had betrayed).
161 See WISE, supra note 43, at 327-28. For examples of information provided by the
victims in the Ames case, see iL at 254-71.
162 See id.
163 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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C. Espionage Compared to Treason
1. Treason as Betrayal
Treason, by its broadest definition, is a betrayal of one's country
and fellow citizens.' 64 While a treasonous betrayal may well cause
great harm to both the country and to individual citizens, treason his-
torically has not required a showing of harm analogous to that of mur-
der. 65 Rather, the act of betrayal is considered per se invidious.
Whether or not it causes great harm, an act of treason undermines the
"sacred agreements of society," and for this reason could deserve the
ultimate penalty. 66
Mindful of the potential for abuse under a broad definition of
treason, 167 the Founders carefully limited the types of betrayals that
could constitute this crime.'68 The Constitution provides: "Treason
against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Com-
fort."169 Aside from setting limits on the scope of the crime, the very
act of defining treason within the Constitution itself confirmed that
the Founders-like their contemporaries-viewed betrayal as the
most dangerous and severe crime against the security of the state.' 70
164 See ARcHER, supra note 101, at 1; see also Carney, supra note 102, at 19 ("Treason is
betrayal on a large scale.").
165 See, e.g., U.S. CONsr. art. HI, § 3; 4 BLACSTONE, supra note 67, at *81--*'97.
166 Carney, supra note 102, at 19; see also id. at 20-21 ("[T]reason affronts the public
trust. Betrayal threatens the conditions for trust, diminishes the strength of the social con-
tract, and ultimately threatens the survival of the group. The impact of treason on the
social order is considered so severe that societies impose the strongest punishment for the
crime of treason."); see also Wilson, supra note 19, at 159 (suggesting that treason can be
defined as "the ultimate violation of community security").
167 See THE FEDERALiST No. 43, at 273 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[A]s new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent
factions ... have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention
have, with greatjudgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a consti-
tutional definition of the crime .... ."); Carney, supra note 102, at 24-31 (detailing abuses
in treason prosecutions throughout the history of England).
168 SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 167, at 273. In fact, all of the substantive and
procedural elements of the Treason Clause stem from English law, as "[t]he framers did
not choose to contrive their own definition of [treason]." HuRsr, supra note 26, at 3-4.
169 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3.
170 See Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) ("Treason is the most
serious offense that may be committed against the United States . . . and its gravity is
emphasized by the fact that it is the only crime defined by the Constitution.") (citations
omitted); see also 4 BLAcsroE, supra note 67, at *82 (labeling treason the highest civil
crime); Carney, supra note 102, at 21 (defining treason as "an unparalleled high crime").
Some of the Framers apparently believed that this constitutional definition of treason
itself foreclosed the death penalty for other crimes against the state. During a debate over
the treason clause, Rufus King warned that "the controversy relating to Treason might be
of less magnitude than was supposed; as the legislature might punish capitally under other
names than Treason." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 347 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966); see also HuRsT, supra note 26, at 150 n.62 (articulating Rufus King's
belief that the central motive for restricting the definition of treason was "to limit the
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If treason is the most serious betrayal against the United States,
the espionage crimes listed in § 794(a)-sharing military secrets with
an enemy or providing the names and causing the deaths of foreign
agents 7 -must therefore be lesser betrayals. One might argue that
this fact alone makes capital espionage subjectively disproportionate
under the Eighth Amendment because offenders of the lesser crime
of espionage could face execution while offenders of the greater
crime of treason may live. 172 The Tison decision, however, indicates
that the Coker test should not be applied this rigidly.' 73 Instead, the
inquiry is whether the betrayal required for capital espionage involves
the same "moral depravity and... injury... to the public"'7 4 as that
required for treason.
2. Espionage as Treason?
Although the capital espionage crimes in § 794(a) resemble the
second type of treason defined in the Constitution, "adhering to...
enemies," an analysis reveals two major differences. 175 First, unlike
espionage, the offense of treason requires that an "enemy" be the ben-
eficiary of the offender's crime. 176 Following English law, American
courts have limited the definition of enemy in the Treason Clause to
"subject[s] of a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us,"
requiring the presence of a formal, declared war as an attendant cir-
application of the death penalty for subversive crimes"). Although the record does not
indicate whether the other Framers acted upon this concern, many of their subsequent
defenses of the Constitution would seem disingenuous if the Treason Clause did not guar-
antee substantive protection against capital punishment for other subversive crimes. See,
e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 469, 489 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1859) (remarks ofJames Wilson); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
360 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) (remarks of James Iredell); see also HURST, supra note
26, at 150 n.62 (discussing remarks of Rufus King). The prevalence of the view may ex-
plain why Congress limited subversive crimes other than treason to non-capital punish-
ments until the twentieth century. See id. at 151 & nn.69-71.
171 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
172 Cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("It is difficult to
accept the notion ... that the rapist.., should be punished more heavily than the deliber-
ate killer....").
173 The Court agrees that society has usually held the murderer who acts with a specific
intent to kill more blameworthy than one who acts recklessly. See Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 156 (1987); id. at 170-72 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Yet by condoning the death
penalty for the latter in Tison, the Court created the risk of an anomaly whereby a killer
who acts recklessly may face death, but one who kills intentionally may receive a lesser
sentence.
174 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality opinion).
175 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. The notion of "levying war" is subject to a strict construc-
tion that would defeat any attempt to associate this type of treason with espionage jeopard-
izing national security. See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 110-12 (1807)
(rejecting the notion of "constructive" levying of war).
176 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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cumstance. 177 Treason, thus, is not any ordinary breach of allegiance
to the United States. Instead, it only involves betrayals in the most
egregious and severe circumstances: those occurring at wartime, and
those involving the enemy.178 Capital espionage under § 794(a), how-
ever, allows the death penalty without regard to the relationship be-
tween the United States and the recipient of the information. 179
While capital espionage certainly could encoripass acts outside the
scope of treason that may endanger national security, peacetime espi-
onage, by definition, does not involve the sort of betrayal that is neces-
sary to rise to the level of treason.' s0
Second, unlike espionage, treason requires at least some showing
of harm to the national security. Article III, Section 3 of the Constitu-
tion requires two separate elements for treason: adherence to the en-
emy and the rendering of aid and comfort.181 A treason prosecution
may fail for want of either element. Therefore, a defendant who ad-
heres to the enemy intending to give them aid and comfort is still not
guilty of treason unless the government can further conclusively prove
that his actions materially aided the enemy and thus harmed the
United States. 182
177 Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 94 (6th Cir. 1943) (using December 11,
1941, the date on which the United States declared war on Germany, as the benchmark for
determining when German subjects became enemies under the Treason Clause). Compare
United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) ("On the breaking out of the war
between the United States and the Imperial German Government, the subjects of the Em-
peror of Germany were enemies of the United States . . . ."), with United States v.
Greathouse, 26 F. Gas. 18, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254) (holding that rebels in
Confederate states waging war against the United States during the Civil War were not
enemies under the Treason Clause).
178 See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 3.
179 See United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Congress wisely
did not distinguish between a friendly or an enemy country in prescribing punishments for
acts of espionage. The law was intended to protect and to keep inviolate our military
secrets from all foreign powers."), afftd, 204 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953).
180 The omission of the "enemy" requirement allows the death sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 794(a) for supplying even allies of the United States with classified military infor-
mation. The case of Jonathan Pollard illustrates this anomaly. Pollard, a United States
naval intelligence analyst, supplied the Israeli government with classified U.S. military intel-
ligence relating to Israel's enemies in the Middle East. See Perl, supra note 127, at 9. He
pleaded guilty to espionage in 1986, before the restoration of the federal death penalty,
and was sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 9-10. Although Pollard accepted over $50,000
from the Mossad, Israel's secret service, he claimed that concern regarding Israel's security
was his major motivation. Id. at 10-11.
Notably, the capital crimes for which the government has enforced death sentences
during this century-sabotage and wartime espionage, see Wilson, supra note 19, at 156-
can be distinguished from peacetime espionage using the enemy criterion. Both crimes
require, at a minimum, that the defendant's betrayal take place in wartime. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 794(b) (1994); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942).
181 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
182 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 36-37, 48. In Cramer, the government proved that the defen-
dant was sympathetic to the German government during World War II, and that he had
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Capital espionage, by contrast, concerns only a possibility of
harm. Section 794(a) embraces the "adherence" prong of treason by
requiring that the actor commit espionage "with intent or reason to
believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of a foreign nation," but imposes no requirement that the
specific act of espionage actually aid the enemy.183 Espionage prose-
cutions, in fact, often succeed in cases where the defendants could not
have significantly aided another country, or where evidence of such
aid is wholly speculative. 184 Because the betrayal in capital espionage
involves only a possibility rather than the actuality of harm to the se-
curity of the country, it is inherently less egregious and less severe
than that of treason, and thus involves an inherently inferior moral
depravity and injury to society. As such, the Coker decision renders
§ 794(a) unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
One could contend that the second type of espionage under
§ 794(a), concerning offenses that compromise foreign agents, is akin
met and conversed with known German spies in the summer of 1942. Id. at 36-37. In a 5-4
ruling, the Court held that this evidence was insufficient to sustain a treason conviction:
The Government contends that ... it has shown a treasonable intent on
Cramer's part in meeting and talking with [the spies]. But if it showed him
disposed to betray, and showed that he had opportunity to do so, it still has
not proved in the manner required that he did any acts... which had the
effect of betraying by giving aid and comfort. To take the intent for the deed
would carry us back to constructive treasons.
Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added).
183 See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941).
184 In United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1601 (2001), for example, the defendants were convicted under § 794(a) for conspiring to
provide East Germany with "information relating to the national defense." Id. at 575. The
court upheld the conviction despite the defendants' claim that the transmitted informa-
tion was already available to the general public. Id. at 575-76. The possibility that East
Germany could have obtained, or might have already obtained, the same information from
another source (thus obviating most of the harm the defendants could have caused) did
not concern the court. Rather, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Gorin v. United States to hold
that the "intent" clause in the Espionage Act "provided a sufficient limitation on the reach
of the Act." Id. at 577.
The Rosenberg case also reveals the importance of the omission of a harm require-
ment for espionage. The government charged that the Rosenbergs provided the Soviet
Union with classified sketches and information that could have been used to construct an
atomic bomb. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Irving Kaufman accused the Rosenbergs
of "putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb," and thus causing "the Communist
aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 .... Judge Kaufman
added, 'Indeed, by your betrayal, you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the
disadvantage of our country.'" RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 14, at 284. In retrospect, the
evidence supporting these allegations of harm is far from convincing. The record, for ex-
ample, contained no evidence at all connecting the Rosenberg's espionage to the Korean
War. Id. Prominent nuclear scientists such as Albert Einstein, Harold Urey, and Philip
Morrison further charged that the information the government accused the Rosenbergs of
transmitting could not have conveyed anything of "real value" to the Russian nuclear pro-
gram. Id. at 432-43. At best, the sketches and diagrams may have helped to confirm the
genuineness of information the Russians received from another spy, Klaus Fuchs. See id. at
444-49.
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to treason in that it retains a harm requirement-"the death of that
individual." 185 This analogy is faulty for two reasons. First, whereas
the harm caused by treason must implicate national security, 86 the
harm accompanying espionage under § 794(a) need only affect a sin-
gle human being. This is not to say that harm done to individuals is
necessarily inferior to harm inflicted against the state.18 7 Rather, this
difference underscores that the subjective proportionality of espio-
nage revealing foreign agents should be evaluated by reference to
murder, a crime against an individual, instead of treason, a crime
against the state.1 88
Second, § 794(a) on its face does not require that the perpetrator
be proximately responsible for the harm. The statute makes espio-
nage capital when the crime "result[s] in the identification by a foreign
power ... of an individual acting as an agent of the United States and
consequently in the death of that individual."189 The absence of the
word "cause" from either clause of the statute is conspicuous, and
probably not accidental. Both of the major recent incidents involving
alleged unmasking of foreign agents-the cases of Aldrich Ames and
Robert Hanssen-have generated considerable doubt regarding the
proximate cause of the betrayals due to the presence of multiple
sources. 190 In fact, the only party that could definitively explain causa-
tion in most § 794(a) cases would be the foreign government respon-
sible for the executions, a fact that presents serious problems
regarding cooperation and reliability.191 The broad wording of the
statute avoids this evidentiary quandary, but at the expense of encom-
passing a great number of espionage crimes that obviated the essential
"enemy" and "harm" requirements of treason.
185 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).
186 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 38 (holding treason indictment invalid because the govern-
ment failed to demonstrate the defendant's act "strengthened [the enemy] or weakened
the United States").
187 See Wilson, supra note 19, at 159-161 (discussing the difficulty of evaluating harms
inflicted against the state in relation to those inflicted against individuals).
188 See supra Part IV.B.2 (applying the Enmund-Tison standard for capital murder to
espionage resulting in the death of a foreign agent).
189 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
190 The Russian government already knew that many of the spies "revealed" by Ames
were working for the United States, thanks to a former CIA agent named Edward Lee
Howard, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1985. WEINER ET AL., supra note 44, at 52-53;
WISE, supra note 43, at 141-42, 258-60. Ames, in turn, had apparently already informed
the Soviets of the moles later "revealed" by Robert Hanssen. See Dan Eggen & Brooke A.
Masters, U.S. Drops Demand for Hanssen's Execution, WASH. PosT, June 15, 2001, at Al.
191 Revealing the original source of a tip and the decisionmaking process would jeop-
ardize the security of the "sources and methods" essential to a major intelligence opera-
tion. See, e.g., Perl, supra note 127, at 26 (quoting a former Director of Naval Intelligence
who warns that revealing such information, even to an ally, could have devastating impact
on future operations).
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D. Aggravating Circumstances
The Coker plurality held that appropriate aggravating circum-
stances could justify the imposition of the death penalty for a crime
that would not otherwise merit such punishment under a subjective
proportionality analysis. 192 Following a conviction for peacetime espi-
onage, the Federal Death Penalty Act requires that the judge or jury
find at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt
before returning a sentence of death.193 The Act provides three ag-
gravating circumstances for treason and espionage: a "prior espionage
or treason offense," the creation of a "grave risk to national security,"
and the creation of "a grave risk of death to another person."'1 94 The
presence of one or all of these circumstances, however, is insufficient
to redeem the appropriateness of the death penalty for peacetime
espionage.
The first of the circumstances, a prior espionage or treason of-
fense, is not only unlikely, but irrelevant under a proportionality anal-
ysis. In Coker, the plurality held that a prior record of even "capital
felonies" did not justify the imposition of the death penalty as long as
the "instant crime" did not merit capital punishment. 195 The federal
statute is less expansive than that in Coker, requiring only that the
prior offense involve the possibility of life imprisonment. 196
The presence of the second circumstance, the requirement that
the defendant "knowingly created a grave risk of substantial danger to
the national security," may enhance the culpability of a defendant
who provides information regarding the national defense to foreign
powers.' 97 Yet this factor still requires neither the actuality of harm
inherent in treason or murder, nor the dealings with wartime enemies
required for a finding of treason. Under subjective proportionality
review, the circumstance thus does not alter the basic, non-capital na-
ture of the underlying crime of espionage. 198 The presence of the
third factor, "knowingly creat[ing] a grave risk of death to another
person"19 9 also fails for this reason, because it merely restates the reck-
lessness requirement deemed necessary under Tison.200
192 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (plurality opinion).
193 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (1994).
194 Id. § 3592(b).
195 Coker, 433 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
196 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b) (1).
197 See id. § 3592(b) (2).
198 Cf Coker, 433 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion) (noting that the aggravating circum-
stances are insufficient because they "do not change the fact that the instant crime being
punished is a rape not involving the taking of life").
199 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b) (3).
200 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (describing recklessness as "know-
ingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death").
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Finally, the presence of multiple aggravating circumstances-
such as where a spy causes both the death of a foreign agent and en-
dangers the national security-does not justify the death penalty
under Coker. Just as Coker could not be executed for committing two
non-capital crimes,201 a spy should not face death for a crime falling
short of both murder and treason. Under subjective proportionality
review, multiple close calls do not justify a death sentence.
CONCLUSION: THE DEATH PENALTY FOR PEACETIME ESPIONAGE Is
OBJECTrIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY DISPROPORTIONATE
Espionage is a terrible crime, offensive to our basic notions of
honor, security, and patriotism. When espionage leads to the death of
another person, innocent or not, the crime becomes even more hei-
nous. This visceral reaction shared by most Americans doubtless
played a role in Congress's imposition of the federal death penalty for
peacetime espionage in 1994.202
The Supreme Court, however, has held that even the most mor-
ally reprehensible crimes do not always merit society's ultimate sanc-
tion. Thus, the crime of rape-the "ultimate violation of self' next to
murder203-does not merit the death penalty. Applying the same ra-
tionale, peacetime espionage should not be a capital crime.
From an objective standpoint, execution for peacetime espionage
has fallen out of favor even among those countries that retain the
death penalty for other crimes. Contemporary public support for cap-
ital espionage executions appears to be lukewarm, at best. Moreover,
the idea of capital peacetime espionage finds no precedent in the his-
tory of the United States dating back to the framing of the
Constitution.
Subjectively, espionage fails to measure up to the standards of
inherent moral depravity and injury involved with the capital crimes
of murder and treason. Espionage, even when leading to the death of
a foreign agent, fails to meet murder's minimum requirements of par-
ticipation and presence. Likewise, espionage, even whenjeopardizing
the national security, does not involve a betrayal as dangerous or as
harmful as that required by treason.
The death penalty for espionage thus creates an anomaly in sen-
tencing whereby spies could face death while purposeful murderers
201 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
202 See, e.g., H.R. 4060, 103d Cong. (1994); 140 CONG. REC. H2225 (daily ed. Apr. 13,
1994) (statement of Rep. Steams); 140 CONG. REc. S1820 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch).
203 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion).
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and dangerous traitors might live.20 4 Such a "wanton and freakish"
result violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments. 205 Spilling the blood of a guilty spy like Robert
Hanssen-or threatening the same against a wrongly accused one
such as Wen Ho Lee-may satisfy the honor of an offended patriot,
but only at the expense of the principles which adhere him or her to
this country in the first place.
204 The death penalty for treason is not mandatory, nor has it been throughout much
of American history. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994) (providing, as an alternative to death,
that the offender "shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but
not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United
States"); ARCHER, supra note 101, at 23-24 (noting that Congress in 1789 originally allowed
imprisonment and fine as an alternative punishment for traitors, "at the discretion of the
court"); HuRsT, supra note 26, at 146 n.49 (explaining that Congress has provided "an
alternative of fine and imprisonment" for treason since the Civil War).
205 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 224 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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